Supreme Court vs Tamil Nadu Governor: A Constitutional Conundrum Unfolds

The Supreme Court of India’s recent judgment in State of Tamil Nadu vs Governor of Tamil Nadu has once again thrust the delicate balance of India’s federal structure into the spotlight, exposing unresolved tensions between legislative supremacy, gubernatorial discretion, and judicial intervention. The case revolves around the refusal of the Governor of Tamil Nadu to assent to bills passed by the state legislature, a decision later complicated by the President’s inaction.

The issue began when the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed multiple bills and sent them to the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution. Under this provision, the Governor has three options: to give assent to the bill, to return it to the legislature with observations for reconsideration, or to reserve it for the President’s consideration. In this case, the Governor initially withheld assent without returning the bills with comments and subsequently referred them to the President. The President neither assented to the bills nor returned them with observations, creating a procedural deadlock.

This sequence of events raises several critical questions:

Can the Supreme Court entertain and decide disputes between a state legislature and the Governor?

Can a bill passed by the legislature but pending assent by the Governor or President be treated as law?

Can the Supreme Court compel the Governor or President to assent under Article 142, invoking the doctrine of “full justice”?

Legislative Supremacy and the Role of Constitutional Heads

India’s Constitution vests the state legislature as the highest law-making authority at the state level. Articles 200 and 201 outline the powers and responsibilities of the Governor and President in the legislative process. The Governor can return a bill to the legislature once with observations or reserve it for the President. However, if the legislature passes the bill a second time, the Governor is constitutionally obligated to give assent.

In Tamil Nadu, the Governor delayed assent and reserved the bills for the President, who in turn neither assented nor returned the bills with observations. This left the legislature in a procedural limbo. The Constitution does not prescribe a specific timeframe for assent, only requiring action “as soon as possible,” highlighting the need for constitutional conventions or constitutional morality to guide such situations.

Advocate Prakash Ambedkar, former Member of Parliament, has criticized the Supreme Court’s intervention, arguing that the legislature has alternative remedies. “The proper constitutional mechanism includes reapproval of the bill, forcing the Governor to assent, or passing a resolution under Article 156(1) to recall the Governor,” Ambedkar said. “By intervening directly, the Court has assumed an authority it was never meant to exercise, bypassing conventions that the Constitution allows the legislature to evolve.”

Presidential and Gubernatorial Discretion

Once a bill is reserved for the President, Articles 87 and 111 require the President to act either on the advice of the Council of Ministers or, under Article 143, seek the Supreme Court’s opinion. If the President fails to act, the legislature may reconsider and reapprove the bill. Ambedkar emphasizes that upon reapproval, the President has no option but to assent, a principle embedded in the constitutional scheme but complicated by the lack of prescribed timelines.

Precedents, such as State of Bihar vs Kameshwar Singh, reinforce that a bill reserved for the President cannot be assented to by the Governor. Further, under Articles 200 and 304, only bills affecting the judiciary, interstate trade, or matters under the concurrent list can be reserved for the President.

Jurisdictional Limits and Constitutional Immunity

Ambedkar highlights significant jurisdictional concerns. The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 131 is limited to fundamental rights violations or inter-state disputes. A disagreement between a legislature and its Governor does not fit these categories. Moreover, Articles 105, 122, 194, 212, and 361 provide absolute immunity to legislative proceedings and to the President and Governor from judicial scrutiny.

“Until the Governor assents, the bill remains the property of the legislature,” Ambedkar said. “Filing a petition at this stage arguably violates Article 212. Moreover, under Article 361, both the President and Governor enjoy immunity from legal proceedings, raising questions about the Supreme Court’s factual basis for concluding any constitutional violation.”

One State, Multiple Powers

A further constitutional nuance lies in Article 12, which defines the State to include the government, the legislature, and the Governor. Can one wing of the State sue another? Ambedkar contends that this crucial question was overlooked. The petition in this case was filed by the State of Tamil Nadu against its own Governor, raising concerns about intra-State judicial authority.

Practical Remedies for the Legislature

If the Governor refuses assent, constitutional practice allows the legislature to:

Reapprove the bill, thereby leaving the Governor no option but to assent; or

Move a resolution under Article 156(1) requesting the President to recall the Governor, as seen in B.P. Singhal vs Union of India (2010).

Ambedkar emphasizes that both these options were available to the Tamil Nadu Assembly but were not pursued, bringing the legislative process to a standstill.

Constitutional Conventions and the Way Forward

The Tamil Nadu case underscores the urgent need for constitutional conventions or moral codes of governance to guide relations between legislatures and constitutional heads. While the Supreme Court intervened to resolve the deadlock, critics argue that the Constitution envisages remedies that allow the legislature to assert its supremacy without judicial overreach.

The case also raises broader questions about the balance of power in India’s federal system. Without clear conventions, legislative will, gubernatorial discretion, and presidential authority can collide, leaving law-making processes vulnerable to stalemate.

As the nation watches, one question remains: in the absence of codified timelines and conventions, who truly holds the final authority—the elected legislature representing the people, or the constitutional heads exercising discretionary powers?

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